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Abstract. This paper investigates Robert Brandom’s programme of
logical expressivism and in the process attempts to clarify his use of
the term practice, by means of a detailed comparison with the works
of sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu. It turns out that
the two scholars have a number of concerns in common, including
the means by which core practices can be amalgamated into more
sophisticated ones, and the possibility of explicating practices with-
out distorting them or generating incoherent codifications. We find
some congruences between the two approaches but also a number of
divergences. In particular, Bourdieu deprecates the well-known dis-
tinctions between langue and parole (Saussure), and competence and
performance (Chomsky), while (we argue) Brandom ends up institut-
ing his own “competence” model. We conclude by questioning how
far this is compatible with his avowed aim of developing an “analytic
pragmatism”.
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates Robert Brandom’s logical expressivism, and
does so by the somewhat unusual route of comparing his approach
with that of the French sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bour-
dieu. Brandom and Bourdieu have both been described as exemplars
of practice theory [15, 20, 16], though Brandom is rather sketchy on
what is taken to constitute a “practice”. The intention is that Bour-
dieu’s rather more thorough-going considerations of this concept,
largely informed in [2] by fieldwork among the Kabyle of northern
Algeria, will suggest ways in which Brandom’s use of it can be inter-
preted or extended. Bourdieu’s highly influential work on the logic of
practice [2, 3] focusses on the notion of practices as the fundamental
level of description of the behaviour of individuals in social contexts.
He is particularly concerned with problems that arise when anthro-
pologists attempt to codify or formalise the practices they observe
among particular communities, or when local informants are asked
to adopt a “quasi-scientific attitude” to their own practices. Brandom
[4, 5, 6] sets out to show how one can develop an account of linguistic
meaning grounded in normative social practice, eschewing semantic
or intentional concepts, and in particular how formal logic can be
shown to be grounded in everyday linguistic practice. Rouse (op. cit.)
places them in opposing camps: according to him, Bourdieu is one
of the theorists who “make central to their discussion of practices
those aspects of human activity which they regard as tacit and per-
haps inexpressible in language”, while Brandom belongs to the party
who “treat language itself (or ‘discursive practice’) as a paradigmatic
application of practice talk”. In fact a close reading of two key texts
[2, 6] suggests that they have a number of concerns in common, and
an examination of their differing responses to these issues may well
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serve to illuminate the thinking of both scholars. For example, Bran-
dom (op cit:33) claims to offer a “logic of practical abilities” while
Bourdieu argues that “practice has a logic which is not that of logic”
(op cit:109). And both are “downstream” of the later Wittgenstein, in
particular the passages of the Philosophical Investigations concern-
ing rule-following. Wittgenstein notes that the idea of “following a
rule” itself assumes that there are “rules for following rules”, while
any type of behaviour can be claimed to be consistent with a rule
with sufficient ingenuity, and suggests that at the end of the day all
one can usefully say is “This is just what I do” (“So handle ich eben”
[24]).
This paper will begin by going into a little more detail about what
is understood by “practice theory” in anthropology and philosophy,
and will then proceed to compare the stances of Bourdieu and Bran-
dom on the issues listed below. We will focus on points (3 - 5), re-
turning to the remainining topics in future work.
1. Communication as challenge and riposte. Bourdieu (op cit:14)
claims that this is “the limit towards which every act of commu-
nication tends” while Brandom’s notion of autonomous discursive
practice requires a speech act of challenging entitlement to propo-
sitional commitments [22, 7].
2. Tacit/implicit knowledge in the form of habitus or material in-
ference. For Bourdieu, individual practices are both constrained
by and contribute to the habitus, defined as “Systems of durable,
transposable dispositions . . . Objectively ‘regulated and regular
without being in any way the product of obedience to rules . . . ”
(quoted by [10]). For Brandom, command of a language involves
the practical ability to deploy a particular vocabulary, including
the ability to make and endorse inferences such as that from This
coat is scarlet to This coat is red.
3. Generative schemes and algorithmic elaboration. Both authors
outline ways in which basic or core practices can be combined to
generate new practices appropriate to particular situations. Bour-
dieu discusses how the gravity of a theft and the concomitant
severity of punishment are determined among the Kabyle of Al-
geria on the basis of “a small number of schemes that are continu-
ally applied in all domains of practice” [2], while Brandom argues
that certain “primitive practices-or-abilities” can be algorithmi-
cally elaborated into more complex ones by procedures equivalent
to transducing automata [6] – though in other cases, “advanced”
practices cannot be algorithmically derived from lower-level ones
and Brandom falls back on a notion of “elaboration by training”
(op cit:83-86).
4. Explicitation. Both authors are concerned with the issue of cod-
ifying or explicating practices. As noted above, Bourdieu argues
that “practice has a logic which is not that of logic” and that clus-
ters of practices cannot always be explicitly codified without dis-
tortion or logical contradiction. Brandom is generally more opti-
mistic, maintaining that logical vocabulary serves to make explicit
inferential moves which are already implicit in any autonomous
discursive practice that lacks this vocabulary [23, 8].
5. Competence and performance: Bourdieu is strongly critical of de
Saussure’s dichotomy of langue and parole, and Chomsky’s re-
lated distinction between competence and performance, both of
which privilege the first term of the pair and (according to him)
treat actual practices as mere degraded “executions” of a pre-
existing set of rules. I shall argue that Brandom [6] in fact rein-
states a competence-performance distinction, and does not deal
with actual practices so much as abstract, potential practices of
idealised agents that are not subject to psychological constraints
and are capable of “perfect” reasoning. I will question to what ex-
tent this is compatible with his avowed “pragmatist” programme.
2 Practice Theories
As noted above, practice theory is a term that has been applied to a
variety of approaches (or practices?) in the social sciences and hu-
manities that seek to study the behaviour of individuals in social
contexts by focussing on performances classed as practices against
a background of other practices in place of such monolithic cate-
gories as culture, class, gender, rules, values, norms and so on. One
motivation for this is that analysts can focus on observable events
rather than postulating unobservable entities such as beliefs, values
or traditions, or speculating about the psychology of the participants’
motives. There is quite a range of activities that have been considered
under this heading, from eating with specific utensils to gift-giving,
playing chess or conducting scientific research. Rouse [16] provides
a useful survey of practice theories across a variety of disciplines. Or-
tner [15] gives a participant-observer’s account of the 1980s “prac-
tice turn” in anthropology which has acquired the status of a clas-
sic. Turner [20] is more sceptical about the possibility of identifying
practices across different performances, but recognises the impor-
tance of the concept in today’s “information society”.
Bourdieu [2] contrasts practices with rule-governed behaviour
by observing that the latter “ceases to convince as one con-
siders the practical mastery of the symbolism of social interac-
tion. . . presupposed by the most everyday games of social inter-
action”, rather we apply a “practical knowledge” which functions
like a “self-regulating device” providing for continual “adjustment
of practices and expressions to the reactions and expectations of
other agents”. One is not consciously consulting internalised lists of
rules for social behaviour, but carrying out approriate practices in a
constantly-changing social milieu according to the constraints of the
habitus. For example, he discusses how “customary law” in tradi-
tional societies
. . . always seems to pass from particular case to particular case,
from the specific misdeed to the specific sanction, never ex-
pressly formulating the fundamental principles which “rational
law” spells out explicitly
3 Discursive Practice
Rouse [16] identifies the role of language as a contentious issue in
practice theory, and argues both that “to use and respond to words
and sentences as semantically significant is to engage in discursive
practice” and that discursive and non-discursive practices are ulti-
mately inseparable. The idea that meaningful utterances can function
as actions that have effects in the social world is associated with the
speech act theories of Austin, Searle and Grice [1, 11, 18]; practice
theories take a different tack, proposing that meaningfulness can it-
self be accounted for as an outcome of social practices. Bourdieu
[3] develops a notion of “symbolic power”, according to which the
meanings of utterances and the efficacy of speech acts derives from
the “social power” of speakers [13]. Brandom takes a more nuanced
approach, seeking to show how semantic meanings can be grounded
in social practices of “normative pragmatics”, without the require-
ment of any explanatory role for semantic or intentional concepts.
As we shall see, his approach involves a somewhat rarefied, abstract
and irreducably normative account of what constitutes a “practice”.
Brandom’s approach is concerned with “deontic” attitudes of hear-
ers, and of speakers as self-monitors, rather than intentional attitudes
of speakers as in classic Speech Act theory. In place of beliefs and
desires, Brandom discusses “doxastic” (propositional) and practical
commitments, which interacting agents may acknowledge or ascribe
to one another.
The normative dimensions of language use according to Brandom
comprise responsibility - if I make a claim, I am obliged to back
it up with appropriate evidence, argumentation and so on - and au-
thority - by making a claim to which I am assumed to be entitled, I
license others to make the same claim. The essential idea is that mak-
ing an assertion is taking on a commitment to defend that assertion
if challenged. There are obvious shared concerns with the notions of
commitment developed by [12, 21]. Brandom’s elaborations include
the notion of entitlement to commitments by virtue of evidence, ar-
gumentation etc; the interpersonal inheritance of commitments and
entitlements, and the treatment of consequential commitments and
incompatibility
The mechanism for keeping track of agents’ commitments and en-
titlements consists of deontic scoreboards maintained by each inter-
locutor, which record the set of commitments and entitlements which
agents claim, acknowledge and attribute to one another (claims and
acknowledgements are forms of self-attribution). Scoreboards are
perspectival and may include both explicitly claimed commitments
and consequential commitments derived by inference. Thus an agent
may be assessed by others as being committed to propositions which
are entailed by his overt commitments, whether or not he acknowl-
edges such commitments. There is another echo here of Bourdieu,
who speaks of agents having “objective intentions” which always
outrun “conscious intentions”. Agents may be in a position of claim-
ing incompatible commitments but may not be assessed as entitled to
more than one of them (if any).
In Brandom’s model, entitlement to a propositional commitment
mostly arises in one of two ways: by inference from a commitment
to which one is already entitled, or by deferral to the testimony of an
interlocutor who is entitled to the commitment. Stated thus simply,
there is an obvious threat of infinite regress on both scores, since it
appears we may not in general acquire any entitlements unless there
are already commitments that we or our interlocutors are entitled to.
Brandom finesses this danger by proposing a “default and challenge”
model: entitlement to a commitment is often attributed by default,
though remaining potentially liable to be challenged by the assertion
of an incompatible commitment. Which commitments are taken to
be prima facie entitled and which are liable to vindication is a matter
of “social practice”.
Brandom’s account of action and intention is initially quite similar
to his propositional story in its overall structure: the role of intentions
is taken by practical commitments which can stand in inferential re-
lations to propositional or other practical commitments, and to which
one may be entitled or not entitled. It is notable that practical com-
mitments can be inferred from propositional commitments as in ex-
amples like:
1. Only opening my umbrella will keep me dry, so I shall open my
umbrella.
2. I am a bank employee going to work, so I shall wear a tie.
Brandom argues that these inferences are not enthymematic, rely-
ing on suppressed premises “I wish to stay dry” or “Bank employees
should wear ties”, but that (1) and (2) are in fact examples of what he
(following Sellars) calls “material inference”: the consequent follows
from the antecedent by virtue of its content, and the putative “sup-
pressed premises” are ways of making explicit the implicit norms or
preferences that make the inferences go through.
Many people encountering Brandom’s work find the notion of ma-
terial inference puzzling and suspicious, particularly in the way it
seems to provide free inference tickets for deriving “ought” from
“is”. In fact, it seems that the disposition to make or endorse such
inferences is taken to be part of the practical ability involved in the
mastery of a particular vocabulary or field of activity, as is the ability
to recognise incompatibilities among commitments. Going back to
Bourdieu’s discussion quoted above, the bank clerk who puts on a
tie in the morning is not necessarily following a rule of appropriate
dress for bank staff (even though such a rule may turn out to be cod-
ified in the staff handbook) but is conforming to a practice – because
“This is what I do” – just as he does not intentionally consult any ex-
plicit rule when deciding whether to put on a pair of shoes rather than
trainers or hiking boots. So the Bourdieusian idea of “practice” turns
out to be closely related to the Sellars/Brandom notion of material
inference.
Practical commitments are taken to stand in inferential relations
with both propositional and other practical commitments, and an ac-
tion is taken to be rational if it fulfils a practical commitment for
which the agent can give a reason. For example: “Why are you wear-
ing a tie?” “I’m on the way to work”. Putting things a little more
technically: to demonstrate entitlement is to offer a chain of reason-
ing which terminates in a practical commitment which is compati-
ble with one’s other acknowledged commitments, and actions result
from “reliable dispositions to respond differentially to the acknowl-
edgement of certain sorts of commitments” [5]. Scorekeepers are li-
censed to infer agents’ beliefs from their intentional actions [Ibid.].
In summary, participation in a discursive practice in Brandom’s
terms minimally involves:
• ability to deploy a vocabulary in ways which are acceptable to
other members of a speech community;
• ability to make and endorse a variety of material inferences;
• ability to keep score of commitments undertaken by interlocutors
and oneself, to recognise incompatible commitments, and to as-
cribe both entitlements and consequential commitments to partic-
ipants in a discourse;
• ability to challenge other practitioners who are assessed as not
entitled to particular commitments.
Note that none of these bullet-points specifically mentions mean-
ings, beliefs or intentions, but it is claimed that a practice involving
these abilities can count as a linguistic or discursive practice. Note
also that the practice involves an abstract notion of a “scoreboard”
and is essentially normative, concerned not so much with observed
practices as with what agents ought to be able to do to count as en-
gaging in dialogue.
4 Elaboration and Explication
Brandom’s ambitious programme, most fully set out in [4], is to start
from a pragmatist approach to language use involving practices such
as assertion and inference, and the assessment of oneself and others
as committed or entitled to putting forward claims, and to show how
one can proceed in a top-down manner to account for phenomena
that are more conventionally studied under the banner of linguistic
semantics such as: the “meaning” or inferential roles of nouns and
verbs; anaphora; quantification; de re/de dicto distinctions, and so
on. The avowed aim of [6] is to contribute to the development of an
“analytic pragmatism”. In this paper we are concerned with one par-
ticular aspect of this programme, logical expressivism: this is essen-
tially the thesis that logical operators serve to make explicit patterns
of inference which are already available in a “base” language that
lacks this vocabulary, and that the introduction of these operators is
semantically transparent and inferentially conservative in that it does
not license any inferences which were not previously available.
In [6] the expressivist project is presented in terms of the notions
of elaboration and explication. The idea is that a set of basic abilities
can be marshalled into a process which implements a higher-level
ability (elaboration), and that one can then define a vocabulary that
specifies or codifies this set of practices (explication). In the partic-
ular case of logical expressivism, the argument is that this elabora-
tion/explication or LX relation enables speakers to say whether a par-
ticular inference is good or bad, rather than simply treating it as such.
Elaboration and explication are considered separately in the follow-
ing two subsections, where each is compared with similar concepts
to be found in Bourdieu [2].
4.1 Generative Schemes and Algorithmic
Elaboration
As noted above, Brandom proposes algorithmic elaboration as pro-
viding a “logic of practical abilities”, while Bourdieu argues that
“customary rules” in a community can be understood as the prod-
uct of
. . . a small batch of schemes enabling agents to generate an
infinity of practices adapted to endlessly changing situations,
without those schemes ever being constituted as explicit prin-
ciples (op cit: 16).
So for example the penalties for theft can be determined by
combining the appropriate customary sanctions, taking account of
whether the offence was committed by day or by night, from some-
one’s house or in a distant field, and so on. Bourdieu’s notion of gen-
erative schemes appears (at least in this case) to be “horizontal”, de-
termining how practices should be combined in particular instances,
while Brandom’s algorithmic elaboration has a “vertical” dimension,
seeking to show how new kinds of practice can emerge from mar-
shalling together a set of core or basic practices. One specific type
of elaboration focussed on in [6] is the introduction of conditionals.
Suppose an agent has the ability to assert p and q, and to “respond
differentially to the inference from p to q by accepting or rejecting
it”. These abilities can be considered to function as automata, the
argument goes, and the automaton can be rewired so that it will re-
spond to the conditional assertion “if p then q” in the same way as it
would have done to the inference from p to q.
This is a ruthlessly condensed version of Brandom’s proposal, but
I think there is enough detail to see how the following issues can
arise:
1. The use of automata theory to demonstrate these processes as-
sumes that agents’ behaviour is deterministic, which seems an un-
realistic assumption for human agents and, I would argue, starts to
introduce a competence/performance distinction which I return to
in section 5.
2. The kind of things that can function as inputs and outputs of these
automata is rather unconstrained: so inputs or “stimuli” can in-
clude abilities to distinguish “poetry that qualifies as lyrical, ac-
tions that are cruel . . . ” while outputs or “responses” could include
“painting well-composed pictures, toeing the party line. . . ”.
3. Turner [20] notes that practices can be “underdetermined” and it
may not always be obvious which practice is instantiated by a par-
ticular performance. In this instance, it is not necessarily clear how
one could infallibly recognise a practice of “accepting or rejecting
an inference”. Returning to the example:
(a) I am a bank employee going to work. (b) I am wearing a
necktie.
there is clearly the scope for ambiguity over whether the speaker
is expressing an inference from (a) to (b), or simply providing
more information about his current activities. That is, the relation
between (a) and (b) could be analysed in RST terms as Elaboration
rather than, say, Volitional Cause [14, 19].
4.2 Explication and Logical Expressivisim
Bourdieu problematises the explicitation of practices on two scores:
1. Attempts to collate and set down on paper various collections of
practices, as for example in the different ways subjects observe
the agrarian calendar, can lead to distortion or incoherence: fea-
tures which are “compatible practically” may turn out to be “log-
ically contradictory”. That is, invidual subjects may pursue prac-
tices that do not interfere with each other, but attempts to codify
and harmonise their combined implicit knowledge may show up
inconsistencies. This objection can be summed up as “practice has
a logic which is not that of logic”.
2. Once a practice has been codified and set down on paper, reflection
on the practice may lead agents to go back and revise it: explicita-
tion is not a one-way street.
Brandom seems to be more optimistic on point (1): he argues that
logical vocabulary must be “semantically transparent” and “inferen-
tially conservative” with respect to material inferences that can be
exhibited in the base language. However, he seems to come closer to
Bourdieu’s stance on point (2), acknowledging that
Once the logical vocabulary has been introduced, it may induce
practitioners to alter their prior practice, in the light of what it
now allows them to say about that practice. [8]
This does in fact seem quite consonant with Bourdieu’s notion of “the
dialectic between the schemes immanent in practice and the norms
produced by reflection on practices” [2]; both authors appear to be in
agreement that explication of practices is not just a one-way process
but can feed back into modification of those practices. A difficulty for
Brandom’s programme of logical expressivism is that we can only
verify this by observing inferential practices before and after the in-
troduction of logical vocabulary. However, the idea that this vocab-
ulary is “introduced” into a linguistic practice which had previously
lacked such terms is a fiction. All we have to go on is up-and-running
practices involving both logical and non-logical vocabulary: as far as
we know there is no natural language or any historical record of one
which lacks negation or conditional locutions, for example. Logical
expressivism therefore has to be interpreted as a claim that logical
vocabulary allows us to codify practices which can be manifested in
a language that has been stripped of such vocabulary. In this situa-
tion, it is hard to see how one could identify the “basic” or “core”
practices as distinguished from practices that may have been altered
in the light of reflections facilitated by logical vocabulary.
A more technical point: Weiss [23] discusses the logical conse-
quence relation defined in [6] which is based on a primitive notion
of incompatibility, and assumes that speakers are able to determine
“a fully determinate incompatibility relation between arbitrary finite
sets of sentences”. He raises the issue that this may be beyond the
reasoning capacities of speakers of the base language, but that the
introduction of logical operators may enable them to “decide unde-
termined incompatibilty relations” (emphasis in original). It is not
clear that Brandom satisfactorily addresses this specific point in his
reply to Weiss [8].
5 Competence and Performance
As mentioned above, Bourdieu is highy critical of Saussure’s well-
known distinction between langue and parole [17], and of Chom-
sky’s related notions of competence and performance [9]. Chomsky
posits an “ideal speaker-listener”, a “homogenous speech commu-
nity” and “perfect grammatical competence”. Bourdieu argues that
privileging langue over parole, or competence over performance, ab-
stracts away from the social context of speech acts, which are always
shaped by the speaker’s position in the social structure, and that ac-
tual practices unfolding over time are thus reduced to (partially suc-
cessful) “executions” of a synchronic set of rules.
In fact, this is not too far from what Brandom offers with his notion
of “algorithmic elaboration” [6] discussed in section 4.1 above. He
acknowledges a number of idealisations, including:
1. response substitution: any input that an agent can discriminate can
be connected to any of its repertoire of responses. In principle, it
should be possible to train an agent to respond with unfeigned de-
light to a disgusting smell such as that of rotten fish, for example
[6, p. 38]. Any restrictions on the ability to arbitrarily hook “dis-
criminative and performative abilities together in arbitrary combi-
nations” count as “psychological restrictions”.
2. arbitrary state formation: state transition tables can be formed
arbitrarily from any combinations of “stimulus-response connec-
tions” of which a system is capable. Again, falling short of this
capability counts as a pyschological restriction.
In sum, Brandom’s automata appear to be rather unconstrained
both in terms of their internal operations and in the range of entities
that can be discriminated as inputs or generated as outputs; rather less
constrained even than Chomsky’s “idealised speaker-hearer” with
“perfect grammatical competence”. It is interesting to note that la-
belling restrictions as “psychological” evidently has the significance
that nothing more can or should be said about them in the current
discussion, or that they are someone else’s problem.
6 Conclusion
In order to get more of a handle on what is meant by the term “prac-
tice” in Brandom’s account of normative pragmatics and inferential
pragmatics, we have looked in some detail at how his use of the term
compares with that of the sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bour-
dieu. We have found a surprising number of similar concerns, in par-
ticular with ways that “core” practices can be combined to form more
elaborate ones, and with issues of making explicit the implicit knowl-
edge which is taken to be immanent in practices. This has led us to
problematise some aspects of Brandom’s programme, in particular:
1. The fact that we have to deal with up-and-running linguistic prac-
tices which already include logical vocabulary, and that the avail-
ability of this vocabulary may have led practitioners to revise their
prior inferential practices, makes it hard to see how one can reli-
ably identify the “pristine” practices which are supposed to have
been elaborated into pre-logical reasoning, other than via hypo-
thetical reconstructions.
2. Rather than taking actual observed practices as a starting-point,
Brandom [6] sets up a rather abstract and unconstrained formal
apparatus or competence, with actual practices having the role of
performances which are degraded by “psychological restrictions”.
Thus on this point he ends up in a position completely opposed to
that of Bourdieu.
It seems almost as if the project of developing an “analytic pragma-
tism” is in danger of drowning the pragmatist baby in the analytic
bath-water. A fruitful direction for future research might be to cease
to regard the psychological dimension as a source of regrettable im-
perfections but as an area of study in its own right, and to investi-
gate whether Brandom’s framework of scoreboards, commitments,
entitlements and so on can provide a useful framework for guiding
empirical studies of human reasoning.
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